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Abstract: We review literature examining the effects of laws and regulations that require public 
disclosure of information.  These requirements are most sensibly imposed in situations 
characterized by misaligned incentives and asymmetric information between, for example, a 
buyer and seller or an advisor and advisee.  We review the economic literature relevant to such 
disclosure, and then discuss how different psychological factors complicate, and in some cases 
radically change, the economic predictions.  For example, limited attention, motivated attention, 
and biased assessments of probability on the part of information recipients can significantly 
diminish, or even reverse, the intended effects of disclosure requirements. In many cases 
disclosure does not much affect the recipients of the information, but does significantly affect the 
behavior of the providers, sometimes for the better and sometimes for the worse.  We review 
research suggesting that simplified disclosure, standardized disclosure, vivid disclosure, and 
social comparison information can all be used to enhance the effectiveness of disclosure policies.  
 
Acknowledgments: We thank Saurabh Barghava, Cynthia Estlund and Daniel Schwartz for 
helpful comments, and Jacob Reisberg and Spencer Baugh for superb research assistance. 
 
Keywords: Mandatory Disclosure, Regulation, Behavioral Economics, Nudges, Telltale Heart 
Effect, Moral Licensing  
  
2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Mandatory disclosure of information – “targeted-transparency” (Fung, Graham & Weil, 
2013) -- is among the most ubiquitous and least controversial elements of public policy, often 
promoted as an attractive alternative to so-called ‘hard’ forms of regulation.  Who can oppose 
low-cost policies designed to provide health and safety warnings to workers, energy efficiency 
information to consumers, privacy information to those giving personal data to companies over 
the web, or disclosure of the financial risks associated with investments, home mortgages, credit 
cards and auto loans?  Despite a paucity of data supporting the efficacy of such policies, 
information disclosure has been broadly advocated as an appropriate response to a wide range of 
social and economic problems (e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, 2013; Kleindorfer & Orts, 1998; 
Lansky, 2002; Sage, 1999).    
An important advantage of informational, as opposed to ‘harder’ forms of regulation, is its 
flexibility and respect for the operation of free markets. Regulatory mandates are blunt swords; 
they tend to neglect heterogeneity and may have serious unintended adverse effects.  For 
example, energy efficiency requirements for appliances may produce goods that work less well 
or that have characteristics that consumers do not want (Allcott & Greenstone, 2012).  
Information provision, by contrast, respects freedom of choice. If restaurant patrons are informed 
of the calories in their meals, those who want to lose weight can make use of the information, 
leaving those who are unconcerned about calories unaffected.  If automobile manufacturers are 
required to measure and publicize the safety characteristics of cars, potential car purchasers can 
trade safety concerns against other attributes, such as price and styling.  Disclosure does not 
interfere with, and should even promote, the autonomy (and quality) of individual decision 
making. If properly designed, it should also increase efficiency, helping to avoid cases of market 
failure resulting from incomplete and asymmetric information coupled with misaligned 
incentives (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Ross, 1973). 
Standard economic theory offers several explanations for why the provision of information 
occurring ‘naturally,’ as a function of market forces, may be suboptimal.  Although there are 
active markets for some types of information, much of the information provided in disclosures 
(e.g., product risk warnings, financial disclosures, or nutrition facts labels) can be viewed as 
quasi-public goods that, due to the free-rider problem, may be under-provided relative to the 
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social optimum.  For example, even if myriad fast food patrons will benefit from calorie posting, 
it is unlikely to be worth any one patron’s time or money to devote much effort to seeking 
disclosure of the calorie content of menu offerings. 
The cost of providing the information (including the cost of enforcing disclosure 
regulations) is, of course, a legitimate consideration (Jovanovic, 1982).  Mandatory disclosure 
can be justified by an efficiency argument when the societal gains from information provision 
outweigh the societal costs (Coffee, 1984).  A comprehensive accounting of costs, moreover, 
should include the time that people need to process the information, the opportunity costs of 
distracting attention from existing information, and even, in some cases, the hedonic cost of 
dealing with the information.  Graphic cigarette warning labels, for example, might seem to be 
low cost, but they may well reduce the utility of people who continue to smoke (Loewenstein & 
O’Donoghue, 2006), and, at least in principle, that loss should be taken into account. The same is 
true of requirements to disclose the caloric content of food, which will have negative hedonic 
consequences for those who continue to eat high calorie foods.  
Given the potential benefits and often low cost of information disclosure, it should come as 
no surprise that disclosure policies have proved highly attractive to legislators and regulators 
(Sunstein, 1999).  The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 
the Affordable Care Act, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
are all packed with disclosure requirements. The same is true of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(implemented in the aftermath of highly publicized accounting irregularities following the failure 
of companies such as Enron and WorldCom), as Ripken (2006) notes in an insightful article.  In 
several of its sections, the act does not ban or require certain corporate or auditor practices, but 
instead mandates disclosure.  For example, it does not require corporations to include financial 
experts on their boards of directors, but requires firms to disclose whether they have, and if not, 
to explain why not.  Similarly, it does not require corporations to adopt a code of ethics for 
senior financial officers but, if no ethics code is adopted, requires corporations to disclose why 
they failed to do so.  
The ubiquity of disclosure is documented forcefully and amusingly in a paper by Ben-
Shahar and Schneider (2010) titled, provocatively, “The Failure of Mandated Disclosure.” The 
authors devote twelve pages of their paper to listing some of the numerous and sometimes absurd 
disclosure requirements embedded in federal and state statutes, administrative regulations, and 
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court rulings, and applying to virtually all types of loans, bank accounts, mutual funds, credit-
cards, securities brokers, credit-reporting agencies, investment advisors, ATMs, pawnshops, 
payday loans, rent-to-own contracts, installment-sales, all types of insurance contracts, vehicle 
rentals, self-storage facilities, car-towing companies, car-repair shops, and much more.  Perhaps 
the most amusing (if somewhat macabre) example is the requirement that funeral operators in 
California disclose to casket purchasers that “THERE IS NO SCIENTIFIC OR OTHER 
EVIDENCE THAT ANY CASKET WITH A SEALING DEVICE WILL PRESERVE HUMAN 
REMAINS.”   
Perusal of this list suggests a common pattern in situations in which mandatory disclosure 
requirements are imposed.  In general, such requirements are applied when less informed 
consumers interact with better informed sellers, and when the incentives of the consumers and 
sellers are at least arguably misaligned. (Note that in many important cases the sellers and 
consumers are providers and recipients of advice.) These features characterize situations such as: 
 
 interactions between an automobile seller and potential customer. The seller has better 
information about the safety of the cars it sells, but the customer may have a greater 
interest in driving a safe car.   
 interactions between a chain restaurant and its patrons.  The restaurant has better 
information about the nutritional properties of the food it sells, but the customer may 
have a greater interest in eating nutritious food. 
 interactions between a physician and a patient.  The physician has better information 
about the appropriateness of different tests and treatments, but may also have incentives 
to recommend specific tests, drugs, or services (such as surgery) that may not be in the 
patient’s best interest.   
 interactions between manufacturers who ‘outsource’ production to establishments that 
mistreat workers or engage in environmentally destructive patterns of behavior, and 
consumers who, while appreciating low prices, have a desire to consume ‘green’ or 
socially conscientious products. 
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In what follows, we focus on these types of situations, characterized by misaligned incentives 
and asymmetric information, often referring to the consumers and sellers as, respectively, the 
“demand side” and “supply side” of the interaction.   
In addition to situations in which disclosure addresses standard economic market failures 
created by asymmetric information and misaligned incentives, we examine situations in which 
disclosure serves the purpose of helping to protect consumers against themselves. Psychology 
and behavioral economics provide a new rationale for regulation that supplements traditional 
economic accounts (Camerer et al., 2003; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). The new rationale involves 
what might be called “behavioral market failures” (Sunstein, 2014).  Analogous to the concept of 
externalities in standard economics, behavioral economics enlarges the potential scope of 
justifiable regulation by introducing the concept of internalities – costs that individuals impose 
on themselves but fail to internalize at the time of decision (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001; Herrnstein 
et al., 1993).  
Note that internalities alone do not provide a rationale for mandatory disclosure regulations; 
at least some kind of misalignment of incentives is important in this case as well.  Suppose that 
at Time 1 a consumer is making a decision that will harm herself at Time 2, with the long-run 
cost exceeding the short-term benefit. If the seller’s incentives are aligned with the consumer’s 
long-term interests, the seller will provide information or products intended to reduce or 
eliminate the internality.  For obvious reasons, this is rarely the case. If fast food customers fail 
to take account of the health consequences of calories, for example, then fast food restaurants 
can exploit this failure by offering enticing but unhealthy menu options that are cheap to 
produce.  Likewise, if car purchasers pay insufficient attention to fuel costs, then car 
manufacturers can offer gas guzzlers that are cheaper to produce and more attractive with respect 
to the attributes to which consumers attend.   
Information disclosure can take a variety of forms (see, e.g., Teisl & Roe, 1998; Worsfold & 
Worsfold, 2007).  The most appropriate form of disclosure depends on the situation in which a 
market failure arises.  It is important to distinguish between situations in which information is 
verifiable (and misinformation can be punished) and those in which information is unverifiable.  
The calorie claims of a fast food restaurant and the fuel economy claims of an automobile 
manufacturer, for example, can be scientifically validated.  However, if a doctor expresses the 
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view that a patient is ideally suited for a clinical trial, there is no way to verify that he really 
believes that, or is conveying it because he will benefit by receiving a referral fee.   
When information is verifiable, disclosure can focus on rectifying an information asymmetry 
– on providing information to the less informed buyer or advice recipient in order to level the 
informational playing field. When a drug company is required to include a warning label with a 
prescription drug, for example, the warning is designed to mitigate the asymmetry in information 
between the manufacturer of the drug, who has access to potential side effects, and the patient 
who, in the absence of the disclosure, would not. The same is true when an automobile company 
is required to include a label with the fuel economy of cars (Sunstein, 2013). 
When information is unverifiable, however, mandatory disclosure attacking the information 
asymmetry would be useless because there would be no way to know if the disclosed 
information is accurate.1  In this case (as well as in the case of verifiable information), the 
informed party could still be required to disclose the misalignment of incentives.  In New York 
State, for example, prospective home buyers and sellers are required to sign (to verify that they 
have been shown) a disclosure form designed to inform “potential buyers or sellers with whom 
[real estate licensees work] of their agency relationship and the rights and obligations it creates. 
This disclosure will help you to make informed choices about your relationship with the real 
estate broker and its sales agents.”    
One might think it should be obvious to disclosees when interests are misaligned, so that no 
disclosure is necessary, but existing research suggests that many recipients of advice are not 
aware of misalignments, or at least behave as if they are not, taking advice from conflicted 
sources at face value (e.g., Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2007).  Beyond suggesting to 
information recipients that they should perhaps mistrust information coming from advisors with 
misaligned incentives, awareness of the misalignment could also encourage advisees to seek out 
advisors with competing interests in order to hear both sides of an argument (Krishna & Morgan, 
2001).  However, disclosure of the misaligned incentives could actually be harmful, too.  People 
might overreact to disclosure, which might prevent an individual from getting good advice (see 
also Li & Madarász, 2008, finding that this can occur even without overreaction), as would be 
the case if, for example, a sick patient avoided the doctor altogether upon learning of her conflict 
                                                            
1 Even when information cannot be verified, some honest communication can occur (see 
Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Farrell & Rabin, 1996). 
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of interest.  In addition, when advisors are ethically motivated to provide unbiased advice, 
disclosure of misaligned incentives can potentially undermine this motivation (a phenomena of 
‘moral licensing’ that is discussed in more detail in Section III).  
Disclosures can also be delivered in various ways.  In the case of a physician, for example, 
disclosure of a potential conflict of interest could come directly from the physician during the 
doctor-patient interaction, or could be provided in a less personal fashion (e.g., via printed 
information given to the patient by the receptionist in the waiting room).  Disclosure can also be 
accompanied by greater or lesser efforts to ensure that consumers actually pay attention to it.  
For example, chain restaurants might be required merely to make nutritional information 
available to those who request it, or, as the Affordable Care Act mandates, to post the 
information on menu boards.  From an economic perspective, some of these details might appear 
inconsequential, but in reality, as we will show, they can matter profoundly.  
 
Overview of the paper 
Although all three of the authors of this review are strong proponents of information 
disclosure and transparency (indeed, Sunstein worked to promote information disclosure in his 
capacity as Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in 
the first term of the Obama Administration, and Loewenstein coauthored a dissent on a NAS 
report arguing in favor of broader disclosures of conflicts of interest (Bero, Krughoff & 
Loewenstein, 2009)), we believe that important and reasonable questions have been raised about 
the efficacy of disclosure requirements.  In this review, we try to provide a fresh perspective on 
the costs and benefits of mandatory disclosure, with an emphasis on psychological insights, and 
we use those insights to explore when disclosure is least and most likely to achieve its intended 
purposes, as well as how disclosure can be changed to enhance its efficacy.  
In Section II, we provide a brief review of the standard (but surprisingly undeveloped) 
economic perspective on information disclosure.  We show that the implications of economics 
for mandatory disclosure are highly dependent on special assumptions, and that some of those 
implications are surprising.  
In Section III, we discuss several psychological phenomena that qualify the predictions and 
implications of the conventional economic analysis.  Consistent with our title, we show that even 
a modest enrichment in our understanding of the psychology of the disclosers and/or recipients 
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can have dramatic consequences for the types of effects we should expect to, and in fact do, 
observe, as well as profound implications for policy.  For example, limited attention, motivated 
attention, and biased assessments of probability can undermine the goal of promoting informed 
consumer choice, potentially rendering disclosure ineffective.  At the same time, disclosure 
requirements can have surprising large effects on providers as a result of what we call “the 
telltale heart effect.”  In the domain of labor law, for example, one of the most significant 
applications of targeted transparency is OSHA’s Hazardous Communication Standard (HCS), 
which does not ban worker exposure to hazardous materials, but seeks “to ensure that the hazards 
of all chemicals produced or imported are evaluated, and that information concerning their 
hazards is transmitted to employers and employees.”  As Estlund (2011:377) notes, “the HCS 
appears to have greater impact on employers’ than on employees’ decisions, and greater impact 
where there is a union that can interpret and act on the rather complex information involved” (we 
return to the important role played by intermediaries in Section IV). Similarly, whether 
disclosure of conflicts of interest by doctors, accountants, or investment professionals mitigates 
or exacerbates the problems caused by these conflicts may well depend less on the reactions of 
recipients than on the reactions of disclosers, who might respond by scaling back those conflicts 
or instead might, as a result of “moral licensing,” feel freer to pursue their own interests at the 
expense of their clients.    
In Section IV, we discuss the implications of research in psychology for when and how 
mandatory disclosure policies should be implemented to maximize benefits and minimize costs 
and unintended consequences.  As we discuss, disclosure could be far more effective if it were 
simplified, standardized, or aided by intermediaries who could serve these functions.  Section V 
offers a summary and directions for future research.   
 
II. The standard economic account of disclosure 
 
Economists tend not to address the benefits and costs of mandatory disclosure regulations 
head on, but focus instead on situations in which market failures may arise.  Market failures can 
result from the absence of information, and hence potentially be rectified by its provision, when 
the social value of the information differs from its private value or when there are misaligned 
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incentives between those with greater and lesser access to information (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Ross, 
1973).   
We have already noted that information, as a public good, may have more social value than 
private value and hence be underprovided relative to the social optimum.  When there are 
significant private costs associated with (acquiring or) disclosing information, but benefits are 
diffuse, no one has an incentive to procure or supply the information.  In this case, mandatory 
disclosure may serve to promote the distribution of socially valuable information (Coffee, 1984).   
Perhaps the paradigmatic situation in which asymmetric information and misaligned 
incentives can cause harm, and in which disclosure might seem likely to be helpful, arises in 
markets for consumer goods.  Sellers and consumers clearly have different incentives: the seller 
is generally interested in making a profit by selling products that are cheap to produce at high 
prices, while consumers are interested in obtaining high quality products at low prices.  Sellers, 
also, naturally, know more about the products they market than do consumers.  Two problems 
can arise.  First, due to the asymmetric information, consumers may be unable to identify, and 
hence purchase, the products that are best for them.  An individual in the market for a credit card, 
for example, might be tempted by a “teaser rate,” even if she would end up paying lower interest 
with a card that had a lower fixed rate.  Second, due to the misaligned incentives, sellers may not 
produce high quality products (that could generate more consumer surplus) because, due to the 
asymmetric information, consumers would not reward them with purchases if they did.  Sellers 
have an incentive to develop products that are strong in attributes that consumers can observe 
and weak in attributes to which they cannot or do not attend (Holmström, 1979). Mandatory 
disclosure of all relevant attributes would, in theory, address this problem.  By reducing the 
information asymmetry between buyer and seller in this situation, mandatory disclosure could 
potentially align the seller’s incentives with the consumer’s (Mahoney, 1995), leading both to 
favor a product characterized by overall high quality.2   
Although mandatory disclosure of information might be helpful in this situation, there are 
also reasons why it might be unnecessary (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1984).  First, one might expect 
market forces to lead to the voluntary provision of information, as firms compete with one 
another to advertise the strength of their own products to consumers, and the weakness of their 
                                                            
2 There are, however, some obscure situations in which mandatory disclosure could worsen the 
problem of misaligned incentives (see Prat, 2005). 
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competitors’ products. For various reasons, however, competition may not be sufficient (Gabaix 
& Laibson, 2006; Milgrom & Roberts, 1986), perhaps because competitors’ interests might be 
more aligned with one another than with those of consumers, even in a highly competitive 
market (Heidhues, Koszegi & Murooka, 2012). For example, a competitor selling a relatively 
safer product may prefer not to scare off consumers with a warning about more dangerous 
products in the marketplace. 
A second reason why mandatory disclosure might not be necessary is that consumers’ 
skepticism could, in principle, force firms to disclose all information about their products, 
including adverse information.  A sophisticated consumer, aware of the seller’s incentives and 
ability to reveal information, can assume the worst about any information that is not revealed, 
which would force the seller to reveal everything (Milgrom, 1981; Grossman, 1981).3  In this 
case, it might be necessary only to disclose the misaligned incentives to consumers, so they can 
adopt the appropriate skeptical attitude.  Of course, in order to use the strategy of skepticism, 
individuals must be aware of what information can be revealed, and, hence what information is 
not being revealed (Dye, 1985; Milgrom, 2008; Shin, 2003), and they must draw the logical 
conclusion that such missing information must be unfavorable (see also Fishman & Hagerty, 
2003).  If consumers lack such awareness or fail to draw the logical conclusion (as discussed in 
the next section), then voluntary disclosure may not occur and mandatory full disclosure can 
once again be justified (Dranove & Jin, 2010; Sunstein, 2014).   
   
III. Insights from Psychology 
In this section we discuss a series of psychological mechanisms that influence the judgments 
and behaviors of disclosers and disclosees. A pervasive theme is that disclosure may have little 
effect on recipients but large effects on providers. 
 
A note on evidence   
In light of the diversity of empirical research methods employed by psychologists and 
behavioral economists (who apply psychological insights to economic problems, typically using 
                                                            
3 Consumer skepticism may not force sellers to voluntarily share their information if doing so 
would entail strategic costs (Board, 2009; Hotz & Xiao, 2013).  Mandatory disclosure would be 
warranted in these cases. 
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economic methods), it will be useful to discuss some of the differences among different 
methodologies.  The studies we review can roughly be classified on two dimensions, depicted in 
Table 1.  Given that demand- and supply-side responses to disclosure often interact in subtle 
ways, studies in the right-hand column of the table –  those that examine interactions between the 
demand and supply sides -- should probably be considered the ‘gold standard’ when it comes to 
understanding the impact of information disclosure regulations.  Likewise, the quality of studies 
tends to improve as one moves toward the bottom rows of the table, given that studies involving 
real consequences for participants (and/or that are conducted in the field examining the behavior 
of the types of people who are actually likely to be affected by the regulations) tend to have 
greater external validity.  By the same token, studies become more costly and difficult to conduct 
as one moves from the top left to the bottom right.  We are, in fact, not aware of a single field 
experiment examining the interaction between the demand and supply side – i.e., a study that 
falls into cell XII.4  
  
                                                            
4 There is an especially pressing need for more studies falling into the right-hand, and especially 
lower right-hand, column of table 1, because market-level interactions between the ‘supply side’ 
and the ‘demand side’ of disclosure can have important consequences, in some cases resulting in 
a redistribution of resources, or even undoing the benefits of disclosure.  Suppose, for example, 
that a disclosure intervention drives many people who were previously choosing highly 
suboptimal, low-deductible health insurance plans toward more optimal high-deductible plans.  
If nothing else changes, consumers would all be better off than they would be without disclosure. 
But, due to competitive market forces, the lower health costs these individuals pay could be 
partly offset by higher premiums for everyone else, and those who had previously been making 
optimal choices with respect to premiums would see their aggregate health costs increase.  
Disclosure, if effective in this situation, will not generate an aggregate benefit to consumers, but 
only a transfer of resources from the more sophisticated to the less sophisticated consumers. 
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Table 1: Taxonomy of Information Disclosure Research Methodologies 
 Study Focus 
Method 
demand-
side 
supply-
side 
demand 
and 
supply 
side 
hypothetical 
choice I II III 
laboratory 
experiments 
with real 
payoffs 
IV V VI 
case studies  VII VIII IX 
field 
experiments X XI XII 
 
 
One other methodological point is worth making.  Many of the studies reported in the 
literature fall into cell I of Table 1 – i.e., address hypothetical choices made by research subjects 
provided with information disclosure.  Such studies are likely to overstate behavioral reactions to 
the disclosure, in part because it is easier to say that one will take some kind of protective action 
than actually to take it, and in part because the disclosures in such studies tend to be much more 
salient than they typically are in real world settings.  The problem is compounded when subjects 
are given multiple decisions to make differing only (or mainly) on disclosures, because the 
variation of disclosures against an otherwise constant background will artificially increase their 
salience.  
 
Limited attention and awareness  
A growing body of research in economics (e.g., Sims, 2003) confirms what psychologists 
(e.g., Broadbent, 1958) have known and studied for decades:  There are serious limitations on the 
amount of information to which people can attend at any point in time (see Simon, 1955 for an 
early treatment in economics).  The standard economic account would emphasize that attention is 
a scarce resource and suggest that people make rational (even if fairly rapid) decisions about how 
to allocate it. Research in psychology, by contrast, suggests that people do not decide how to 
allocate attention; certain items capture attention while others disappear into the background, 
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even if they are exceedingly important, and even if it would be rational to focus on them. The 
distinction between the two accounts matters for some purposes but not for others. The most 
general point is that limits on attention may well be the most important factor affecting the 
efficacy of disclosure. 
Bounded attention renders many disclosures useless because consumers ignore them.5 They 
respond, “yeah, whatever,” and move on. For example, researchers (Carlos, Potts & Jensen, 
2005) find that fewer than 3% of consumers read the privacy disclosures that are so ubiquitous 
on websites, and that 75% of consumers think that the existence of a privacy policy implies 
privacy protection (Turow et al., 2008 ) even though the actual thrust of such policies is often the 
opposite – to secure the consumer’s acquiescence in relinquishing privacy.6 Disclosures are so 
ubiquitous that we tend to be unaware of them, and, when the implicit is made explicit, one 
cannot help but be struck by the impossibility that anyone could attend to even a fraction of the 
disclosures to which we are exposed.  
One of the most common, and obviously important, forms of disclosure involves product 
warning labels.  Summarizing results from approximately 400 articles dealing with on-product 
warning labels, McCarthy et al. (1984) conclude that “on-product warnings have no measurable 
impact on user behavior and product safety.” When disclosure requirements turn out to be 
ineffective, it might be worthwhile to consider improved approaches that nonetheless involve 
information (see Section IV below) or other regulatory approaches, including default rules 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
 
Inattention to missing information 
As discussed in Section II, a key assumption of the economic analysis (leading to the 
conclusion that disclosure is unnecessary when disclosed information is verifiable) is that people 
are aware not only of information that they are presented but also of information they are not 
                                                            
5 Other research shows that the impact of disclosures can be severely reduced by the introduction 
of even short delay, or distraction, between the delivery of a disclosure and a disclosure-relevant 
decision (Adjerid et al, 2013). 
6 This lack of attention, and resultant misconceptions, should come as no surprise.  It has been 
estimated that 54% of privacy policies are beyond the grasp of 57% of the Internet population  
(Carlos & Potts, 2004), and, somewhat amusingly, that the aggregate dollar value of the time it 
would take for US consumers actually to read privacy policies would be $652 billion/year 
(McDonald & Cranor, 2008). 
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presented, but could be.  More specifically, the standard economic analysis assumes that when 
companies provide individuals with selected information, people fill in the blanks with the worst 
possible values, assuming that if the information was favorable it would be disclosed. Research 
in psychology suggests that this key assumption is unlikely to be true.  We have already 
discussed research showing that people have only limited capacity to attend to information that 
they are presented with; other research (summarized in Nisbett & Ross, 1980) shows that people 
typically pay even less attention to the absence of information than to its presence, even when 
both are equally informative.  
More evidence of inattention to missing information in a real world market context (Cell IX 
in Table 1) comes from research examining the cold-release of movies – i.e., the release to 
consumers without first giving access to reviewers.  Studios cold-release movies when they are 
confident that the reviews will be unfavorable, and consumers should ideally draw the logical 
inference from the release of movies with no prior reviewer coverage.  However, Brown, 
Camerer, and Lovallo (2012, 2013) find that, in fact, cold-released movies do initially better than 
movies that are pre-released to critics only to receive predominantly negative reviews.   
The consequence of people’s inattention to missing information is that voluntary disclosure 
policies are unlikely to be effective.  If, for example, physicians could sign up for a clean conflict 
of interest certification, patients might infer from the lack of such a certification that a doctor 
must be conflicted.  But if patients systematically fail to notice the absence of the certification, 
then doctors would be commensurately less motivated to eschew conflicts (Sah & Loewenstein, 
2013).  Similarly, prior to the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act, makers of salad dressings 
with higher fat content chose not to label these products voluntarily, but with mandatory 
disclosure, their sales declined (Mathios, 2000). 
 
Motivated attention 
Even when people have the cognitive capacity to attend to the information provided by a 
disclosure, they do not always do so.  Information is not only an input into decision making; it is 
a source of utility in its own right (e.g., Brunnermeier & Parker, 2005; Caplin & Leahy, 2001; 
Golman & Loewenstein, 2013; Köszegi, 2010; Loewenstein, 1987; Schelling, 1987).  When 
information is unpleasant to deal with, people often fail to attend to it. Research on investor 
logins, for example, shows that investors tend to log in and look up the value of their portfolio 
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after a rise in the market, but ‘put their head in the sand’ after the market declines (Karlsson, 
Loewenstein & Seppi, 2009; Sicherman et al., 2013).  Research on medical testing for 
conditions, such as HIV, finds that the people who are most at risk often do not get tested 
because the prospect of the disease is too scary to think about, or because they are afraid to 
expose themselves to the risk of getting bad news (Thornton, 2008).    
One such study examined the decisions of individuals at risk for Huntington’s disease about 
whether to get tested (Oster, Shoulson & Dorsey, 2013).  Even though knowing whether one had 
the disease should be an enormously valuable input into decisions (such as whether to have 
children), many people chose not to get tested until they started experiencing symptoms.  Even 
more interestingly, those who did not get tested made life decisions, such as whether to have 
children, that did not differ from those who were tested and discovered they did not have the 
disease; for purposes of decision making, people appeared to treat the absence of testing results 
as tantamount to the absence of the disease. 
The most obvious implication of motivated attention for mandatory disclosure policies is that 
disturbing messages might well be ignored or downplayed.  Research on the impact of emotional 
health warnings – so-called ‘fear appeals’ – does, in fact, show that scary warnings 
unaccompanied by immediate options for remediating action can backfire, apparently because 
people are deterred by fear from thinking about, and hence become less likely to respond to, the 
risks (Leventhal, 1971; Rogers, 1975; Loeber et al., 2011). In a similar phenomenon, people have 
been shown to suffer from unrealistic optimism, especially with respect to personal risks (Sharot, 
2011), and unrealistic optimism could well weaken the effects of disclosure. 
A more subtle implication is that disclosure policies intended to mitigate selective provision 
of information by firms may not work as well as might be expected.  Even if companies do not 
engage in selective withholding of information (whether voluntarily or due to disclosure 
regulations), consumers may, in effect, take up the slack by paying attention to information that 
supports decisions that they may have already decided to make and ignoring or downplaying that 
which does not.  If ice cream parlors would prefer not to post calorie information, but are forced 
to do so by regulations, consumers who like ice cream may take over the ‘editing’ role that 
regulations prevent the parlors from implementing, by ignoring information that, if attended to, 
would reduce their pleasure. 
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Biased probability judgments  
While standard economics allows for the idea that probability judgments might incorporate 
random error, the conventional assumption is that people do not display systematic biases – that, 
on average, people estimate things correctly.  For a variety of reasons, this is not the case (see, 
e.g., Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). Research has found that people have systematically 
biased beliefs about, for example, food calorie content (Bollinger et al., 2010), returns to 
schooling (Jensen 2010), potential earnings in other countries (McKenzie et al., 2007), and the 
impact on energy consumption of driving cars differing in fuel economy (Allcott, 2011). 
Misestimates of probabilities can have important implications for disclosure.  For example, 
providing information about the health consequences of smoking is intended to deter people 
from smoking, and calorie information is intended to help people cut down on their calorie 
intake.  But these effects are likely to occur only if, prior to disclosure, people are systematically 
biased in a direction that promotes the undesirable behavior, which may not be the case.  
Research by Viscusi (1990), for example (albeit controversial in part because he is a paid 
consultant to cigarette companies), finds that both smokers and nonsmokers tend to overestimate 
the health risks of smoking (though see Slovic, 2000, for a contrary perspective, finding 
underestimates of personal risk even in the face of accurate estimates or overestimates of 
statistical risks).  If Viscusi is correct, then disclosure of the true risks of smoking could end up 
promoting smoking.   
 
Moral licensing  
There is by now a very large literature in behavioral and experimental economics 
demonstrating what people outside the profession might find obvious -- that people are 
powerfully driven by other-regarding motivations such as altruism, fairness, and a desire to 
perceive themselves as good people, and that, all else held equal, people prefer to tell the truth 
(Gneezy, 2005) and also expect others to do so (e.g., Valley et al., 2002).  These motivations can 
be important in the types of misaligned relationships that are the common focus of disclosure 
policies, because they can motivate sellers to behave in the interests of buyers even when they 
have material incentives not to do so.7   
                                                            
7 Cognitive biases can, in some situations, have a similar effect.  The “curse of knowledge” (Camerer, Loewenstein 
& Weber, 1989:1245) refers to the fact that people with private information often overestimate the extent to 
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The fact that people are intrinsically motivated to provide unbiased advice and high quality 
products (even when they could pass off inferior ones to naïve consumers) is important, because 
disclosures of conflicts of interest can, in some cases, undermine such motivation, a phenomenon 
that Cain, Moore and Loewenstein (2005) dubbed ‘moral licensing.’   Moral licensing occurs 
when the perception that an advisee has been warned, via disclosure, of an advisor’s potential 
bias makes the advisor feel less responsible for giving unbiased advice.  In a study demonstrating 
the phenomenon, Cain, Loewenstein and Moore (2011) asked respondents to a survey to imagine 
that they were participating in an experiment in which they played the role of ‘advisor’ and gave 
advice to another person (the ‘estimator’) who would made money by accurately estimating how 
many jellybeans were in a jar that was depicted in a photo. Participants were all given a 
(hypothetical) conflict of interest: “Suppose that you are paid a $50 bonus if the estimator 
overestimates the number of jellybeans in the jar.” Participants were also told that the jar actually 
contained between 1900 and 2900 jellybeans.  All participants were asked to rate the ethicality of 
suggesting “a number above 2900 (in hopes that the estimator overestimates the number of 
jellybeans),” but in one condition estimators were told that “the estimator is unaware of your $50 
incentive,” and in the other they were told that “the estimator is aware of your $50 incentive.” 
Consistent with moral licensing, respondents reported that it would be more ethical to overstate 
the number when the estimator was aware of the conflict.   
In a series of stylized experiments, the same authors showed that moral licensing was 
sufficiently strong so that conflicted advisors were better off, and advice recipients were worse 
off, when a conflict was disclosed, as compared to the same situation but without disclosure 
(Cain et al., 2005). These findings were later replicated and extended in an experiment modeling 
a real-life situation of a homebuyer and a conflicted real estate agent (Cain et al., 2011).   These 
studies (falling into cell VI in table 1) show that, beyond the problem of information disclosure 
having little impact, disclosure of misaligned incentives can in some cases backfire, hurting 
those it is intended to help. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
which it is shared.  As the authors note, “By making better‐informed agents think that their knowledge is shared by 
others, the curse helps alleviate the inefficiencies that result from information asymmetries, bringing outcomes 
closer to complete information (first‐best) outcomes. In such settings, the curse on individuals may actually 
improve social welfare.” 
18 
 
Panhandler and insinuation anxiety effects 
Two additional psychological phenomena raise further concerns about the potential for  
disclosure of misaligned incentives to backfire.  Disclosing that an advisor has a conflict of 
interest does, research suggests, have the intended consequence of decreasing advisee trust.  But 
perversely, due to two psychological mechanisms, it can also increase pressure to comply with 
the distrusted advice.   
The first mechanism, the ‘panhandler’ effect, results from the fact that once a conflict has 
been disclosed, the advisor’s interests become common knowledge, and, in some situations, 
advisees may feel pressured to help advisors obtain their personal interests.  For example, once a 
doctor discloses that he or she earns a large referral fee if their patient enrolls in a clinical trial, 
the patient may implicitly feel that he or she is being asked to “help” the doctor get the fee.  
Insinuation anxiety arises from the advisee’s fear that rejecting advice (once they learn 
about a conflict of interest) sends a negative signal that they believe the advice is biased and the 
advisor is corrupt.  Without disclosure, for example, an investor might not want to invest in a 
new mutual fund recommended by their financial advisor due to risk aversion or satisfaction with 
current investments. However, after the investment advisor has disclosed that he/she will receive 
a financial benefit if the investor buys into the new fund, the customer may fear that their failure 
to follow the advisor’s recommendation to do so is likely to be interpreted as a signal of distrust 
– an indication that they doubt the advisor’s ability to transcend the conflict.  
In a pair of papers, Sah, Loewenstein and Cain (2012; 2013) report on the results of lab 
studies involving hypothetical and real outcomes, as well as field studies, in which conflicted 
advisors interacted with advisees who either were or were not informed of the conflict.  In all 
experiments, disclosure increased distrust in advice but, due to either the panhandler effect or 
insinuation anxiety, also increased advisees’ feelings of pressure to comply with it.  Moreover, in 
several of the experiments, the latter influence was stronger than the former, so that advisees 
ended up being more likely to comply with the advice, even though they trusted it less. 
 
The spotlight and the ‘telltale heart’ effect 
 Psychology does not always work against the effectiveness of disclosure. On the 
contrary, the ‘telltale heart effect’ suggests that psychological factors may increase the 
effectiveness of disclosure when, from an economic standpoint, it might be expected to be 
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superfluous.  In the classic account of how disclosure works (e.g., Fung, Graham & Weil, 2007), 
mandated disclosure leads to changes in the behavior of disclosees, which in turn cause 
disclosers to ‘clean up their act.’ In a case often cited as a paradigm for successful disclosure, for 
example, hygiene ratings of restaurants in LA affected patronage patterns, which then motivated 
restaurants to improve their sanitation practices (see, e.g., Jin & Leslie, 2003).8   But in many 
situations (to some extent including the case of restaurant hygiene ratings), an industry response 
can be found amidst little evidence of a consumer response.   
This pattern raises an obvious question: Why are providers changing their products in 
response to disclosures that their customers are largely ignoring?  On the basis of profit 
considerations alone, consumer inattention should lead producers to do exactly what they were 
doing before. Evidently some disclosers either have an exaggerated expectation of the likely 
consumer response or feel guilty about the information disclosed.  We suspect that sellers may 
well have an inflated sense of the public salience of disclosures, in a phenomenon related to the 
spotlight effect (Gilovich et al, 2000), by which people exaggerate how much other people are 
looking at them, and also analogous to the confession of the protagonist in Edgar Allen Poe’s 
(1843)  famous short story, The Telltale Heart, who imagines that the police can hear the 
heartbeat of the man he has killed and buried beneath the floorboards of his apartment.  
Most current evidence generally seems to suggest either a modest effect or no effect, on 
consumers, from calorie labeling (e.g., Harnack & French, 2006).9 But in a study that provides 
evidence suggestive of a telltale heart effect, Namba et al. (2013) combed an archive of publicly 
accessible web pages for changes in posted menu offerings at fast food restaurants between 2005 
and 2011, a period during which several municipalities introduced calorie posting.  Menus from 
5 fast-food chains with outlets in areas subject to menu-labeling laws were compared with menus 
from 4 chains operating in areas not requiring labeling.  Although the overall prevalence of 
                                                            
8 The same authors also obtained evidence that mandatory disclosure was more effective than 
voluntary disclosure, and that, although the grade cards did lead to real improvements in 
hygiene, they also led inspectors to distort their ratings 
9 See, however, Bollinger et al. (2010) finding a nontrivial effect on consumer choices. 
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healthier food options remained low over the period, restaurants located in areas that 
implemented calorie labeling increased healthier entrée options.10   
Increasing the number of healthy options does not, however, mean that consumers will 
necessarily choose them.  In a study showing that a greater prevalence of healthy options can end 
up backfiring by creating a ‘halo effect,’ Chandon et al. (2007) finds that consumers significantly 
underestimate the calories in an ostensibly “healthier” meal from Subway than for a comparable 
meal from McDonald’s.  The same study also finds that health claims can lead consumers to 
order sides and beverages that contain more calories, a kind of substitution effect also observed 
in a field experiment conducted at Subway, in which consumers were ‘nudged’ toward lower 
calorie entrees via a ‘convenience menu’ that included only low calorie sandwiches (Wisdom, 
Downs & Loewenstein, 2009). 
Further evidence suggestive of a telltale heart effect comes from the literature on 
appliance purchases, which to date provides relatively weak evidence of consumer 
responsiveness to energy efficiency labeling, but much stronger evidence of manufacturer 
responsiveness.  Newell et al. (1999), for example, find that after energy efficiency labeling was 
mandated in the U.S., responsiveness of energy-efficient innovation in appliances to energy price 
changes increased substantially.  Waide (2004) documents a trend toward more efficient 
products in the EU that began right after the onset of labeling and that was so strong that market 
saturation of certain appliances with an “A” rating led regulators in the EU to create A+ and A++ 
ratings to encourage greater efficiency through product differentiation. 
One situation in which a telltale heart effect may be especially effective is corporate 
ethics and socially responsible behavior.  Writing not only about corporations’ concern for their 
public image, but also about consequent potential benefits of information disclosure regulations,  
Estlund (2011:378) contends that “the lengths to which leading firms go to advertise their 
virtuous performance on matters of sustainability, diversity, ethics, and overall social 
responsibility suggest that more is at work than ordinary labor market or product market 
competition... Mandatory disclosure of accurate information about socially salient conditions of 
employment (as well as other objects of CSR claims), would help to ensure that there is a factual 
                                                            
10 The average calorie content for entrée items showed no similar difference in changes across 
the two groups of restaurants (presumably because with calorie labeling, unhealthier options got 
even worse). 
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basis for firms’ claims of social responsibility, and that firms cannot easily buff up their 
reputation for good citizenship without improving their actual practices.” The telltale heart effect 
might well be playing a role here. 
 
IV. Making disclosure work 
 
The research just reviewed has implications not only for when and why disclosure is 
likely to work or backfire, but also for potential improvements of disclosure policies.  
 
Simplification 
      Given the limits of human attention, perhaps the most obvious way to improve the 
effectiveness of disclosures is to simplify them.  As Ripken writes, “In order for a disclosure 
system to be effective, not only must the information that is supplied be disclosed completely, 
clearly, and accurately, but it must also be read and comprehended by the consumer. Here is 
where disclosure today fails in its purpose.”  Her paper focuses on financial disclosure, where the 
problem is especially acute since corporate disclosure documents tend to be packed with abstruse 
text written to protect companies from liability rather than to provide investors with 
comprehensible information. But the point is broadly applicable. 
 Barghava and Manoli (2013) provide evidence for the benefits of simplification. In a field 
experiment testing different interventions to increase take-up of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) using mailed communications, they found that decreasing the complexity relative to a 
baseline notice (which itself produced take-up of 14%) increased take-up by 6 percentage points.  
Also consistent with an important role for simplicity, increasing complexity decreased take-up 
by 4 percentage points.  
 If information simplification is, in principle, a good thing, exactly how to simplify 
information is anything but a simple problem, and again some obvious approaches may have 
unexpected pitfalls.  Studies conducted both in the U.S. and abroad have shown that using 
categorical labels, such as stars or letter-grades, rather than a continuous scale, leads to better 
comprehension, a faster grasp of label information, and greater ease of use  (Thorne & Egan 
2002; Wiel & McMahon 2003).  Newell and Siikamaki (2013), for example, found that 
consumers who were exposed to different energy efficiency disclosures and made hypothetical 
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choices between water heaters (in a within-subjects experiment) were more responsive to, and 
more likely to make cost-efficient decisions after receiving, simple as compared with more 
complex energy efficiency labels. Consumers were most influenced by simple information about 
the monetary value of saving energy; additional information about placing this cost within a 
range of comparable models did not have significant additional value.   Perhaps most 
importantly, a categorical label leads to increased self-stated motivation on the part of the 
consumer to consider energy efficiency as part of the purchase decision (Newell & Siikamaki 
2013; FTC 2006). 11  
On the other hand, results from two preliminary studies (VanEpps, Downs & Loewenstein, in 
progress) point to the potential pitfalls of categorical ratings.  While ordering lunch, subjects in 
both studies (one conducted at a fast-food restaurant and the other using a web-based ordering 
system at an office building) were presented with menus on which food items were designated 
by traffic lights that corresponded to their calorie content.  Green light items had fewer calories 
than yellow and red light items.  But in both studies, people seemed to take green as the “go” 
sign that it typically is, and they availed themselves more freely of green light items.  Worse, 
when people did decide to select yellow or red light items, they tended to opt for higher calorie 
items within the category, seemingly with the logic that “if I’m going to consume a red light item 
anyway, I might as well get the most fulfilling one I can.”   
 If simplification is the general goal, perhaps the most obvious change in policy with 
respect to mandatory disclosure regulations is one that would be most difficult to implement: 
reduce the number of less important disclosures so as to increase the salience of the most 
important ones.  In today’s regulatory environment, the obstacle to such a change is that 
disclosure regulations arise from a wide range of legislative and regulatory sources at the federal, 
state and local levels.   
 
Standardized and comparative information 
People are generally able to make more coherent and rational decisions when they have 
comparative information that allows them to assess relevant tradeoffs (see, e.g., Hsee et al., 
                                                            
11 However, for 15% of the consumers in this study, the presence of CO2 information decreased 
willingness to pay for a lower operating cost.  This surprising result may be a product to political 
reactions to ‘environmental issues’ and reflect how those reactions may negatively affect energy 
efficiency adoption (Gromet et al., 2013). 
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1999). This point suggests that disclosures that provide comparisons, or information in 
standardized formats that facilitate comparisons, may have the greatest impact and benefit.  If 
information is presented in a way that does not allow comparisons, it may not be meaningful, 
especially because people might not do the cognitive and other work that would enable them to 
make such comparisons on their own. 
Energy efficiency labels for automobiles and appliances in the U.S. are only two 
examples of many disclosures that do provide comparative information – in such cases about 
how the operating costs of the car or appliance in question compare to that of others.  Another 
example is the College Scorecard, which is intended to promote better post-secondary education 
choices. The Scorecard provides standardized information that allows prospective college 
students to compare costs, graduation rate, loan default rate, amount borrowed, and employment 
for every degree-granting institution in the country.  
Although (and perhaps because) the benefits of providing standardized information about 
alternative products appear manifest, there is not a great deal of research that examines whether 
such information makes a difference. Some evidence does, however, suggest that comparative 
information along with other interventions can be effective.  In one study (Bertrand & Morse, 
2011), prospective payday borrowers, already routinely provided with the APR of payday loans 
(typically around 450%), were also provided comparative information about the cost of other 
types of loans.  In one treatment, the typical APR of a payday loan was contrasted with that of 
other loans that consumers were likely to be familiar with such as car loans (typical APR 18%), 
credit card (16%) and subprime mortgage (10%).  In another treatment, the dollar cost of payday 
loans of durations ranging from 2 weeks to 3 months was contrasted against the much lower 
dollar costs of credit card debt.  A third treatment provided information about the (high) fraction 
of people taking out payday loans who end up renewing the loan.  The dollar cost information 
condition had the largest, although somewhat modest and only marginally significant, impact, 
both on loan initiation and loan amount.  Since this was not the only comparative condition, but 
was the only condition involving dollar as opposed to percentage information, the former may 
have been the key aspect of the intervention that increased its impact.  Indeed, another (albeit 
hypothetical choice) experiment, examining choice of investment funds differing in fees by 
financially illiterate workers (Hastings & Tejeda-Ashton, 2008), also found a greater impact on 
choice of presenting information in dollar, rather than percentage point, terms.   
24 
 
In a randomized field experiment, some senior citizens choosing between Medicare drug 
plans were randomly selected to receive a letter with personalized, standardized, comparative 
cost information  (Kling et al. 2012).  Plan switching was 28% in the intervention group, but only 
17% in the comparison group, and the intervention caused an average decline in predicted 
consumer cost of about $100 a year among letter recipients.  Note, however, that this 
intervention combined a number of different aspects (comparative and personalized 
information), so we cannot isolate a single mechanism that explains its effectiveness (a point we 
return to in the next subsection). 
Other research suggests that merely providing comparative information is insufficient to 
enhance choice; it is important how information is sorted.  In a study of the impact of the U.S. 
News and World Report college rankings, Luca and Smith (2013) exploited a natural experiment 
that resulted from a change in the way that universities were listed.  From 1989-1994, the top 50 
universities were listed with the top 25 universities in order of rank, but the next 25 ordered 
alphabetically (though reporting rank).  In 1995, U.S. News began listing all of the top 50 
universities in order of rank.  The authors found that a change in rank for universities in the 
bottom half of the 1-50 range had a significant impact when all 50 were ordered by rank (high 
salience), but no impact when the focal universities were ordered alphabetically (even though 
rank was reported).12   The evident reason is that with the alphabetical listing, some cognitive 
work had to be done to ascertain ranking, and even though that work was modest, people 
declined to do it. 
A different study examined the impact of simplified school-level academic performance 
information on the school choices of parents in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Public School District 
(Hastings & Weinstein, 2008). The study produced less encouraging results, both for 
simplification and ordering.  In a randomized field experiment (one of two studies that the 
authors report), parents of children in randomly selected schools who were provided with 
                                                            
12 Similarly, Pope (2009) finds that changes in the ranking of hospitals (and specialties within 
hospitals) have a major impact on patient volume, even though the continuous score on which 
the rankings are based (which is arguably a finer-grained measure of the same thing) has no 
significant additional impact. 
25 
 
statistics on, and sorted by, different schools’ academic achievements, did not make better school 
choices than those who did not receive the information. 13  
 
Social comparison information 
Media mogul Ted Turner once complained that Forbes Magazine published a list of the 
wealthiest Americans but not the most generous, an omission that was later corrected by Slate 
Magazine.  Research suggests that such social competition can encourage generosity.14  Social 
comparison information can operate through a variety of channels.  Beyond playing on the 
natural human desire to be above average on almost anything that can be measured, social 
comparison information can potentially establish ‘descriptive norms’ that often convert into 
‘injunctive’ ones (Schultz et al. 2007).  
Perhaps the most carefully studied intervention provides homeowners with information 
about how their energy use compares with that of their neighbors.  Opower, a company based in 
Virginia, works with utilities to send people a personalized Home Energy Report, which includes 
comparison to their neighbors (for example “great,” “good,” and “more than average”) and is 
accompanied by “Energy Saving Tips,” such as “move your thermometer up 2 degrees,” and 
“when you’re away, set it higher.”  Evaluations of the Opower intervention have found that when 
people learn that they are using more energy than similarly situated others and are provided with 
tips on how to reduce energy use, their energy use declines significantly (Allcott & Rogers, 
2012; Allcott, 2011).  Although the effects are not large (approximately a 2% reduction), the 
cost-effectiveness of the intervention compares favorably to that of other, more standard 
programs designed to promote energy conservation. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that the causal mechanisms are not yet well 
identified, because the program combines comparative information with tips (sometimes 
described as “channel factors” in the psychological literature), and existing designs cannot 
                                                            
13 The natural experiment did, however, provide support for the idea that mailing parents (albeit 
somewhat complicated) information about school performance did improve their  school choice 
decisions. 
14 In a clever experiment, Duffy and Kornienko (2010) found that subjects who played a 
sequential “dictator game” gave more when placed in a generosity tournament (in which subjects 
were publically ranked from most to least generous) as compared with an ‘earnings’ tournament 
in which subjects were ranked according to how much they kept, even though there was no 
award associated with winning the tournament. 
26 
 
exclude the possibility that the effects result from an increase in energy awareness on the part of 
the consumer as a consequence of receiving the report, regardless of its specific content (see 
Schwartz et al., in press).  It should also be noted, that several studies have found little or no 
impact of social comparison information, and at least one study (the previously discussed study 
by Barghava and Manoli, 2013) actually found that social comparison information had a perverse 
effect, decreasing takeup of the EITC by 4.4%.   
 Public ratings of corporations and other institutions have also been found to influence 
their behavior.  One paper, for example, examined the impact on firm behavior (release of toxic 
chemicals, as reported to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory) 
of being suddenly included among the ranks of firms whose relative performance was publicly 
graded (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010).  The researchers found that firms that initially rated poorly 
subsequently improved their performance, as compared to firms that were never rated or rated 
more favorably. Other studies of the same program also find significant effects, which they 
attribute to a fear of “environmental blacklisting” (Fung & O’Rourke, 2000; Hamilton, 2005; 
Konar & Cohen, 1997).   
Social comparison information also seems to have played a role in positive progress 
made in reducing certain types of conflicts of interests in academic medical centers (those 
associated with gifts to physicians from pharmaceutical companies and device manufacturers).  
The American Medical Student Association PharmFree Scorecards (which grades COI policies 
at US academic medical centers; see www.amsascorecard.org) appears to have been successful 
in encouraging many academic medical centers to implement stronger COI policies. Similarly, 
mandatory disclosure of marketing costs for prescription drugs in the District of Columbia 
produced a downward trend in marketing expenditures by pharmaceutical companies, including 
gifts to physicians, from 2007 to 2010, and the announcement of the names and amounts 
received from industry by the top eight physician speakers in 2009 resulted in a significant drop 
in the amounts received by this group in the subsequent year compared to a comparison group 
(the next eight speakers whose names and industry amounts were not disclosed) (The George 
Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services, 2012). 
Although these and many other examples suggest that “regulation by shaming” can be an 
effective strategy for improving the performance of firms and other organizations (Graham, 
2000), it is important to note that in some situations, it can produce perverse effects.  Rankings of 
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schools by the media can produce a kind of self-reinforcing dynamic whereby low ratings lead to 
a drying up of resources and decline in the quality of students, making it difficult if not 
impossible for schools to rectify problems identified by their rankings (Espeland & Sauder, 
2007).   
Moreover, social comparison information does not even always lead to a desire to 
improve, at least on the intended dimension.  In the case of Opower,  providing the social 
comparison information does seem to lead to an average net decrease in electricity usage, but 
some studies have documented so-called “boomerang effects” whereby those discovering that 
they are consuming less than average actually increase their usage (Schultz et al., 2007; see also 
Costa & Kahn, 2013, finding that Republicans increased their energy usage; but see Allcott, 
2011, finding no such effect).  
 
Vividness 
It is well-understood that vivid displays may have a larger impact than dry, statistical 
information (see, e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980), and this point has significant lessons for disclosure 
policies. In the context of smoking, for example, many studies indicate that warnings that 
combine pictures and text are more effective than text alone in decreasing demand for cigarettes 
– perhaps by triggering strong emotions, perhaps by increasing awareness of risks, and perhaps 
by promoting thoughts about quitting.  (See Borland et al., 2009; Hammond et al., 2006; 
O’Hegarty et al., 2006; Thrasher et al., 2011).  In that context, the relevant pictures can be 
gruesome or shocking, such as images of diseased organs, and these images have been found to 
have a greater impact on smokers than words suggesting more abstract injury (Sobani et al, 
2010).  As discussed in section III (under the heading of motivated attention), however, there is 
some danger that the use of pictorial warnings could backfire; consumers might direct their 
attention away from the gruesome pictures, and thus insulate themselves from the warning 
information (e.g., Loeber et al., 2011). 
 
Smart disclosure and the role of intermediaries 
 In some situations, exemplified by the abstruse legalistic disclosures accompanying 
securities transactions, the language or underlying information is far too complex for a layperson 
to digest.  In other situations, exemplified by the privacy notifications that no one reads on 
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Internet sites, the volume of information is overwhelming and not worth the investment one must 
make to read it.  In still other situations, exemplified by conflict of interest disclosures, the 
disclosures are neither complicated nor long, but their implications for behavior are difficult to 
assess.  If a doctor informs a patient that she will receive a referral fee if the patient enters a 
clinical trial she recommends, should the patient decline to enroll?  Making this determination 
requires a difficult judgment about whether the doctor’s recommendation has been colored by 
the disclosed conflicts.   
In all of these situations, unsophisticated recipients of advice could likely benefit from 
the intervention of more savvy intermediaries to help them make sense of the information.  Many 
non-profit organizations, such as the Consumer’s Checkbook (http://www.checkbook.org/), 
already perform this function.  Instead of attempting to provide information directly to 
consumers, disclosure requirements could make information available in standardized formats so 
that intermediaries can arise to process it, make sense of it, and (perhaps for a fee) provide it in a 
form that is usable to its end users. Such an approach might well yield benefits beyond those 
contemplated by its implementers.  Consider GPS information, which is used in creative and 
useful ways that early proponents of its release could never have anticipated.  Consistent with 
this goal, the “Smart Disclosure” initiative, undertaken by the Obama Administration (Sunstein, 
2013), is designed to encourage providers to disclose downloadable, machine-readable 
information, in part so that intermediaries can help consumers of (for example) energy and health 
care to learn about their own behavior and, as a result, make more informed choices. 
 
Promise and pitfalls of in-person disclosures 
 Given that many disclosures have little impact because they fail to stand out among the 
onslaught of competing disclosures, it is reasonable to expect that in-person disclosure would be 
a good thing, in part because it might increase salience.  There is, however, very little evidence 
to support (or refute) this prediction.  One field experiment conducted by Chetty and Saez (2013) 
found no impact on earnings in the year following a two-minute tutorial on the financial 
consequences of the Earned Income Tax Credit delivered in-person by tax preparers to low-
income clients.  However, the lack of response may well have reflected the complexity of the 
incentives and subtlety of behavioral adjustments that individuals would have had to make to 
respond to incentives.  
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Although in-person disclosure might well increase salience, it also has demonstrated 
pitfalls.  In a series of follow-up experiments to the studies by Sah, Loewenstein, and Cain 
(2012, 2013) described earlier, the authors tested different remedies for the adverse effects of 
insinuation anxiety and the panhandler effect. These studies revealed that advisees who received 
the COI disclosure from an external source (i.e., not directly from the individual with the 
conflict), who could make their choices privately, or who could change their minds afterwards 
were less likely to follow biased advice than those who were informed of the COI by the advisor 
and had to make their final choice in her presence. These results suggest the possibility that 
people should not make significant decisions until they have had time to think on their own 
(away from their advisors) or unless a cooling-off period is available in which clients have the 
opportunity to cancel or change their minds without consequence. Applied to medicine, for 
example, the research points to the prescription for policy that patients should decide whether to 
follow recommended treatments only after leaving the pressures of the doctor’s office. 
 
Disclosure versus other policies 
 As we have shown, disclosure holds considerable promise as a tool of public policy, 
especially as a means of altering the behavior of disclosers as opposed to disclosees.  However, it 
also has severe limitations, and can backfire in certain situations, damaging the interests of those 
it is intended to help.  Given these limitations, and the always present temptation of taking the 
path of least resistance, policy makers need to be vigilant against the risk that mandatory 
information disclosure policies will be implemented as a substitute for other, often more 
effective, regulatory interventions (see Loewenstein & Ubel, 2011).   
 
V. Further Directions and Conclusions 
 
Other domains of disclosure 
Although we chose to restrict our review to a relatively narrow range of situations – 
specifically interactions between buyers and sellers characterized by asymmetric information and 
misaligned incentives -- disclosure is an enormous topic, and could potentially encompass a very 
wide range of phenomena.  For example, there is a burgeoning literature on the economics (and 
behavioral economics) of privacy (Acquisti & Taylor, forthcoming) which looks at the issue of 
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information disclosure from a very different perspective – that of individuals disclosing 
information to others, for example on social media. Although different in its focus, this research 
has also highlighted the importance of psychology by demonstrating a range of psychological 
mechanisms that lead people to divulge information when it is not in their interest to do so, but to 
‘clam up’ when costs to disclosure are low or benefits are high (e.g., Acquisti, John & 
Loewenstein, forthcoming). 
 Perhaps the most closely related, and in-depth, research that we do not discuss in this 
review is reported in the large literature dealing with transparency and accountability initiatives 
applied to (and coming from) government.  In the U.S., statutes originating in the 1966 Freedom 
of Information Act and extending to the Obama Administration’s “open-government” initiative, 
largely oriented to making the data routinely collected by the Federal Government easier to 
access and parse, have been discussed at some length (Sunstein, 2013), as have similar initiatives 
in countries as diverse as the U.K., Mexico, India and China (e.g., McGee & Gaventa, 2011).  
Funding to study such initiatives, provided by several foundations, has resulted in a wide range 
of findings and insights, many parallel to those reported in this paper.  For example, one of the 
important claims from the literature on open government initiatives is that transparency alone 
may not be sufficient to produce beneficial social change; for change to occur, it has been 
suggested that transparency has to be accompanied by accountability. Information provision may 
have little impact in the absence of institutions and mechanisms that have the capacity to channel 
the information into concrete action (see, e.g., Fox, 2007).   
 
Need for further research 
 Although calls for further research in academic reviews are almost pro forma, the need 
for further research on the effects of disclosure requirements is evident from both the ubiquity of 
such requirements and the paucity of research that seeks to understand when, why and how they 
work.15 There is, first of all, a need for qualitative research examining how individuals and firms 
                                                            
15 There is, for example, little evidence about the impact of personalizing information.  Kling 
(2012) and Bettinger et al. (2012) have studied treatments involving personalized information 
along with other interventions, but the independent effect of personalization remains an open 
question. 
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respond, or fail to respond, to disclosure.  Regulators may fail to appreciate the nature and the 
extent of differences between their own goals and values and those of the people who are most 
affected by the disclosures.  For example, proponents of calorie posting hold an implicit 
assumption, which is that the people whose health would benefit from calorie reduction will 
want to cut calories.  This assumption undoubtedly holds for many of the recipients of the 
information, but for many others it may be an example of projection bias – of the tendency to 
assume that other people’s goals are similar to one’s own.  
People who are overweight are disproportionately poor, and many poor people are as 
likely to want to save money as to lose weight.  One way to save money is to maximize the ‘bang 
for the buck’ – i.e., calories per dollar – which the calorie information, combined with price 
information, can help a fast-food patron to do, potentially leading to a consequence opposite of 
the intended one.  Although quantitative researchers rarely do more than pay lip-service to the 
benefits of qualitative research, disclosure regulation is a domain in which the need for 
qualitative research is especially pressing.  The implementation and use by end-users of 
disclosures can bear little resemblance to what the originators had in mind. 
The second pressing need is for additional randomized controlled trials and field 
experiments.  Sometimes public policies get ahead of the data justifying their implementation.  In 
light of the complex economic and psychological mechanisms at play in the real world, one of 
the major themes of this paper is the difficulty of anticipating demand and supply side reactions 
to disclosure requirements.  This is precisely why experimentation is so important.  Ideally, new 
proposed disclosures should be tested on a limited scale, via randomized field experiments, 
before they are rolled out to the general public (Greenstone, 2009).   
Such limited-scale experiments should allow for more in-depth analyses of effects than 
have generally been conducted.  For example, studies that have examined the impact of calorie 
labeling have tended to focus on the impact of labeling on a single meal.  However, even if 
calorie labeling does change people’s selections at a restaurant, any benefit could easily be 
undone if after eating a low-calorie lunch, people end up snacking more later in the day.  In a  
study that examined the impact of ‘nudges’ and nutrition information on meal choice, for 
example, the calorie reduction benefits of a nudge toward lower-calorie sandwiches were undone 
because those so nudged were more likely to choose high-calorie side orders and drinks 
(Wisdom, Downs & Loewenstein, 2009).  
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 Another way in which smaller scale experimental studies could go more in-depth would 
be to follow consumers over time to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects.  On 
the one hand, one might expect effects to persist in the long-term if short-term changes result in 
changed habits, or if the information is learned and the learning results in sustained behavior 
change. In fact some studies do find such effects (e.g., Allcott & Rogers, 2012). However, there 
is a risk that information disclosures will tend to lose impact over time as the information enters 
into the background of the consumer’s awareness and ultimately becomes ignored.   
 
Conclusions 
Psychological factors severely complicate the standard arguments for the efficacy of 
disclosure requirements. Because attention is both limited and motivated, disclosures may be 
ignored, especially if they are complex, and new disclosures, even of valid information, may turn 
out to distract attention from older and possibly more important ones. As a result of limited 
attention and many other psychological factors discussed in Section III, disclosure requirements 
appear to have been less effective in changing recipient behavior than their most ardent 
proponents seem to assume they are, or should be.  
At the same time, disclosure may have large effects on producers, which presents an 
independent puzzle: If consumers are unaffected by disclosure requirements, why would 
producers change their behavior? We have suggested that ‘the telltale heart effect’ provides a 
large part of the answer. Providers of information may well overestimate the likely effect of the 
disclosure on consumers, partly because that disclosure seems so salient to providers. As a result 
of the telltale heart effect information disclosure can have beneficial effects even when it fails to 
change consumer behavior. 
Unfortunately, disclosure of misaligned incentives can have perverse effects on the 
producer side of the equation.  Specifically, advisors who would have otherwise been 
intrinsically motivated to provide unbiased advice can feel ‘morally licensed’ to provide biased 
advice once a conflict of interest has been disclosed.  Moreover, due to panhandler and 
insinuation anxiety effects, advice recipients may feel greater pressure, following disclosure, to 
follow the now less trusted advice.   
We have suggested a set of psychologically informed strategies that might make 
disclosure more effective, including simplification, standardization, and the use of social 
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comparisons.  Clearly, further research is needed to gain a better understanding of when, why, 
and how disclosure policies have intended or unintended consequences, as well as how such 
policies can be improved, but one thing is clear: Psychology changes everything. 
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